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Has the Euro Affected the Choice 





We present a new approach to study empirically the effect of the introduction of the euro on 
currency invoicing. Our approach uses a compositional multinomial logit model, in which 
currency choice depends on the characteristics of both the currency and the country. We use 
unique quarterly panel data of Norwegian imports from OECD countries for the 1996-2006 
period. One of the key findings is that the eurozone countries in trade with Norway have 
substantially increased their share of home currency invoicing after the introduction of the 
euro. In addition, the euro as a vehicle currency has overtaken the role of the US dollar in 
Norwegian imports. The econometric analysis shows a significant effect of euro introduction 
above and beyond the determinants of currency invoicing (i.e., inflation rate, inflation 
volatility, foreign exchange market size, and product composition). However, the rise in 
producer currency invoicing by eurozone countries is primarily caused by a drop in inflation 
volatility. 
JEL-Code: F14, F15, F31, F33, F36, E31, C25. 
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Currency invoicing of international goods trade has interested academics and policy makers
as early as the 1970s when the Bretton Woods system of xed but adjustable exchange rates
collapsed and the principle trading countries in the world moved to exible exchange rates.
The introduction of the euro in non-cash form (i.e., electronic transfers, banking, etcetera)
on January 1, 1999 and in cash form on January 1, 20021 has given a renewed impetus to
the invoicing literature.2 The introduction of the euro is believed to have had a substantial
impact on traders' choice of invoicing currency. More specically, the euro would boost
home currency invoicing by eurozone countries and euro use by countries trading with the
eurozone members.3 So far, only a few empirical studies have analyzed the determinants of
currency invoicing, but none of them measure the eects of the euro on currency groups as
well as individual currencies during the two stages of euro introduction. This paper therefore
empirically investigates whether the euro has aected invoicing practices across countries.
The objective of this study is to empirically assess the impact of the euro on the choice
of invoicing currency using a unique invoicing dataset for Norway. The data (measured at a
quarterly frequency) consist of the value of Norwegian goods imports broken down by country
and currency for the period 1996{2006. Although the overall dataset covers all countries,
the econometric analysis includes only 29 OECD countries, roughly capturing 85 percent of
Norwegian trade. The invoicing data used in this study span the introduction of the euro,
the transition period 1999{2001 (when both the euro and legacy currencies4 could be used in
trade), and a suciently large post-transition period. We have chosen Norway because it is
not part of the eurozone, which allows the study of the eect of the euro on partner currency
use in Norwegian trade with eurozone countries and on vehicle currency invoicing outside
the eurozone.5 We use dummies for the year of introduction of the euro and the use of the
euro during the transition period to investigate whether invoicing practices are aected by
1The euro was introduced on January 1, 1999 in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Greece joined on January 1, 2001, bringing the
total number of European Union member states adopting the euro (the so-called eurozone) to 12 countries.
Nowadays, the eurozone consists of 16 countries.
2The \New Open Economy Macroeconomics" literature also contributed to this revival. See Section 2.
3Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2005) present a theoretical analysis, whereas Kamps (2006) and Goldberg
and Tille (2008) empirically assess the determinants of countries' euro invoicing share in a cross-country setting.
See Section 2 for a discussion of the invoicing literature.
4Legacy currencies are the currencies of the eurozone members that ceased to exist at the end of the
transition period toward euro introduction.
5A \vehicle" or \third" currency is neither the currency of the exporter nor that of the importer in a trade
transaction. We will use the terminology \vehicle currency" and \third currency" interchangeably.
1the euro. In addition, we analyze whether the euro has caused a substantial shift in invoicing
patterns by employing Andrews's (1993) structural break test for nonlinear models.
We employ a compositional multinomial logit approach that weights the probability of
choosing a particular currency by its respective currency share. This approach is appropri-
ate because we have compositional data, that is, the currency shares lie in the closed unit
interval [0;1], add up to unity for a particular country at one point in time, and are corre-
lated. Our analysis incorporates the characteristics of 31 currencies and thus goes beyond
just characterizing the share of the partner currency or the share of a single currency (e.g.,
the euro). We employ both xed eects and pooled compositional multinomial models, where
the former specication controls for unobserved heterogeneity across countries. To allow for
a proper inference of the variables' magnitudes, we derive average marginal eects. Because
there seems to be a strong inertial bias in favor of using whatever currency has been used
in the past (so-called hysteresis), we also use a dynamic model that includes past currency
shares.
So far, the empirical invoicing literature has only used explanatory variables related to
the partner countries in trade (i.e., country-specic variables). This study introduces a new
approach that relates covariates to the currencies (i.e., currency-specic variables), that is,
we propose the conditional compositional multinomial logit (CCML).6 More specically, the
CCML approach makes it possible to relate traders' invoicing motives directly to the cur-
rency attributes, that is, a euro dummy, a euro transition dummy, exchange rate volatility
of the chosen currency to the local currency (Norwegian Krone), exchange rate volatility of
the chosen currency with respect to the partner currency, the depth of the currency's foreign
exchange market, and the past currency share. Currency-specic variables contain infor-
mation that reects more realistically the trader's decision problem at hand. However, to
make inference practical, we group the 31 currencies in three groups|i.e., producer currency
invoicing (PCI), local currency invoicing (LCI), and vehicle currency invoicing (VCI)|and
identify them broadly. In our study, PCI denotes invoicing in the home currency of the
exporter (partner country), whereas LCI refers to invoicing in the currency of the country
where the exporter's goods are sold (Norway). Besides these methodological extensions and
the measurement of the euro eect, the paper also contributes to the invoicing literature more
generally by considering a broader set of covariates. New variables of interest such as ination
volatility, the depth of the foreign exchange market, and the degree of dierentiation of the
6The discrete choice literature usually refers to the country-specic and currency-specic regressors distinc-
tion as \alternative-invariant" and \alternative-varying" regressors, respectively.
2partner country's export package are considered.
The descriptive analysis of the data shows a change in Norwegian invoicing patterns during
the period of euro introduction. Norway's trading partners participating in the eurozone use
their own currency (i.e., the euro) more frequently than before the introduction of the euro.
In addition, the euro is chosen more often as a vehicle (or third) currency than the US dollar.
The econometric analysis shows that above and beyond the control variables, the introduction
of the euro has had a signicant positive eect on the share of producer currency invoicing by
eurozone countries. Conditional on key fundamental variables, the producer currency shares
of Mediterranean countries in the eurozone beneted the most from euro adoption. The
analysis is also the rst to show the quantitative signicance of|the much hypothesized|
ination volatility variable. The rise in invoicing in producer currencies by eurozone countries
is primarily caused by a drop in ination volatility. Three other signicant explanatory
variables are identied: the ination rate, the size of the foreign exchange market, and the
degree of product dierentiation. Finally, our model is stable across the time period of euro
introduction. The structural break tests nds a peak of the test statistic around the time of
introduction of the euro, but it does not exceed the 10 percent signicance level.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3
describes the Norwegian invoicing data. Section 4 discusses the econometric methodology.
Section 5 presents the results on the euro eect and the determinants of invoicing currency
choice more generally. In addition, it investigates a possible structural break in invoicing
patterns related to the euro. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The theoretical literature on the invoicing eects of euro introduction and monetary integra-
tion more generally is rather small. Bacchetta and Van Wincoop's (2005) two-country general
equilibrium model on invoicing currency choice is a notable exception. They hypothesize that
if a set of countries form a monetary union they are more likely to invoice in the union's
currency. Intuitively, if multiple countries adopt the same currency, the market share that
matters is that of the entire currency union, not that of individual countries. The study
of Devereux, Engel, and Storgaard (2004) deals with a potential indirect eect of monetary
integration. They argue that exporters and importers will generally prefer to set prices in the
currency of the country with a more stable monetary policy, as given by the variance of the
relative money supplies.
3The studies of Devereux, Engel, and Storgaard (2004) and Bacchetta and Van Wincoop
(2005) build on the New Open Economy Macroeconomics literature, which is primarily ini-
tiated by the work of Obstfeld and Rogo (1995), also known as the Redux model. Key
features of this research line are monopolistic competition and sticky nominal prices pre-set
in a particular currency. An important issue in this literature is in which currency prices
are assumed to be sticky. The Redux model assumes producer currency pricing (PCP), that
is, exporters set prices in their home currency. Accordingly, there is complete exchange rate
pass-through of prices of imported goods to prices of domestic goods, ensuring that pur-
chasing power parity holds at all times. However, Betts and Devereux (2000) show that the
expenditure-switching eect of a nominal exchange rate change under PCP breaks down if
rms engage in local currency pricing (LCP), that is, exporters pre-set prices and invoice in
the importer's currency.7 Devereux, Engel, and Storgaard (2004) and Bacchetta and Van
Wincoop (2005) are some of the few studies to endogenize the PCP/LCP share.
Little is known empirically about the determinants of invoicing, let alone the eect
of currency unions on invoicing patterns.8 A few econometric studies focus on invoicing
determinants|using data for a single country|without touching upon currency union issues;
that is, Donnenfeld and Haug (2003) for Canada, Wilander (2006) for Sweden, Donnenfeld
and Haug (2008) for the United States, and Ligthart and Da Silva (2007) for the Netherlands.
Wilander (2006) uses data on individual transactions, whereas the others focus on aggregate
currency shares. Most of these studies show that a country's market power|measured in
terms of a country's world export share|leads to increased invoicing of its home currency.
In addition, Ligthart and Da Silva (2007) nd home currency invoicing to be positively af-
fected by the rate of ination in the partner country and negatively aected by the degree of
development of the partner country's banking sector. They also nd that European Union
countries invoice less in vehicle currencies.
Kamps (2006) and Goldberg and Tille (2008) empirically assess the eect of euro introduc-
tion on currency invoicing. Both studies use aggregate cross-country data for currency shares
as the dependent variable, but do not take into account that the invoicing shares should be
viewed as a system of equations.9 Because the shares add up to unity, an increase in one share
7Krugman (1987) was one of the rst authors to point out that foreign rms price locally.
8The limited number of studies no doubt reects the considerable condentiality with which the invoicing
data are treated by central banks and customs oces.
9Both Kamps (2006) and Goldberg and Tille (2008) employ very unbalanced data sets, reecting the
scarcity of invoicing data at the cross-country level. Some countries cover the whole time period, whereas only
individual years are observed for other countries.
4necessarily implies a drop in other currency shares. Kamps (2006) regresses both the euro and
US dollar share on a set of explanatory variables. She additionally analyzes|in a separate
regression equation|the home currency share in exports and imports. Her analysis covers
42 countries and uses annual data for the 1994{2004 period. Kamps nds that a country
being a member of the European Union (EU) or an EU accession candidate plays a decisive
role in the choice of the euro as invoicing currency. In addition, the share of euro invoicing
rises if a country pegs its currency to the euro, has a larger share of dierentiated products
in exports, and trades more with the eurozone. Countries' US dollar share in invoicing is
negatively aected by their membership of the eurozone.
Goldberg and Tille (2008) use the invoicing share of the US dollar and the euro as the
respective dependent variables. Their analysis consists of 24 countries (including among
others nine EU accession countries, Australia, the United States, and Japan) and uses annual
observations for 1996{2003 and thus covers only one year after the full-blown introduction of
the euro. Goldberg and Tille (2008) nd that the US dollar is predominantly used in countries'
invoicing of goods trade with the United States and in the setting of prices of goods traded
on organized exchanges. They show furthermore that the euro is primarily employed as an
invoicing currency by countries trading a substantial share of their goods with the eurozone.
3 Data and Descriptive Analysis
The data used in this study have been collected by the Norwegian customs oce. The
Norwegian customs law requires traders to report all goods trade transactions of a value
exceeding NOK 10,000 (euro 1,127). A small fraction of trade (less than 3 percent) is censored;
it does not exceed 5 percent in trade with any partner country. The customs oce has
provided the aggregate values of Norwegian goods imports broken down by currency and
country of the trading partner for the 1996{2006 period. Because of condentiality concerns,
single transactions are not made available. In addition, transactions in the oil and shipping
sector|in which just a few large rms are active|are excluded from the reported data. In
the following, we assume that the currency of payment (as recorded in the data) in any period
is equal to the currency of invoicing (which we cannot observe). Friberg and Wilander (2008)
point out that in more than 90 percent of the cases the two coincide.
We include 29 OECD countries in our analysis. The total of value of Norwegian imports
from OECD countries is on average 85 percent (Table A.1), representing a large share of
Norwegian trade. The share of producer currencies (PCI) varies substantially across both
5OECD and non-OECD countries. The home currency share of Norway's most important
trading partner (Sweden) amounts to 45.4 percent, whereas that of its second most important
trading partner (Germany) is 71.6 percent. Although China is ranked as Norway's eighth
largest trading partner, the share of the Renminbi is negligible. More generally, many of the
non-OECD countries have a negligible or zero share of PCI.
Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows the currency share of every partner country equally weighted,
whereas Panel (b) gives the trade-weighted currency shares.10 The introduction of the euro
as a virtual currency in 1999 is indicated by the rst dotted vertical line, whereas the second
dotted vertical line depicts the date of introduction of the euro in cash transactions in 2002
(which marked the abolition of the national currencies of the EU member states). At the
aggregate level, the invoicing shares remain stable despite the introduction of the euro. Panel
(a) of the gure shows a small increase in the use of producer (or partner) currencies (the
dashed line) and a slight drop in the use of the Norwegian Krone (the solid line).
By focusing only on countries in the eurozone [Panels (c){(d) of Figure 1], we can see that
there have been some substantial changes after the introduction of the euro. Panel (c) shows
that before the introduction of the euro imports in the eurozone (equally weighted) are mainly
invoiced in the Norwegian Krone. Indeed, we can see that the share of producer currencies
(30 percent) is only slightly above that of vehicle currencies. The Norwegian Krone makes up
40 percent. This invoicing pattern dees \Grassman's law," which says that trade is mainly
invoiced in the currency of the exporter.11 After the introduction of the euro in cash form,
however, the share of partner currencies substantially rises and becomes dominant. During
transition, the euro share (the dashed dotted line) gradually increases, whereas the share of
the eurozone legacy currencies slowly drops. Panel (d) also reveals a substantial rise in the
trade-weighted currency share of the eurozone countries, although it is less pronounced than
under equally-weighted currency shares.
Have there been changes in the invoicing pattern with respect to vehicle currencies? Panel
(a) of Figure 2 shows that the legacy currencies of the eurozone countries start o in 1996 at
32 percent and the US dollar at about 53 percent. The category \other vehicle currencies"
10Norway's ve biggest OECD trading partners make up more than 50 percent of its imports. To preclude
that the invoicing pattern of the \big ve" will overshadow the invoicing of Norway's trade with smaller trading
partners, we calculate equally weighted currency shares by averaging over the bilateral currency shares. The
latter are used in the econometric analysis of Section 4.
11Grassman (1973) found in his descriptive analysis of Swedish goods trade that 2/3 of exports to indus-
trialized countries were invoiced in the producer's currency and 1/4 are invoiced in the local currency. Other
authors in the 1980s found a similar invoicing pattern, which explains why the literature has coined this pattern
Grassman's law.
6Figure 1: Invoicing Shares in Norwegian Imports from OECD Countries
(a) 29 OECD countries (equally weighted) (b) 29 OECD countries (trade weighted)
(c) Eurozone countries (equally weighted) (d) Eurozone countries (trade weighted)
Notes: The data pertain to all OECD countries excluding Norway. The rst vertical line indicates the
introduction of the euro in non-cash form, whereas the second vertical line represents the introduction of
the euro in cash transactions. The thick solid line represents the share of local currency invoicing (LCI),
the dashed line denotes the share of producer currency invoicing (PCI), the dotted line depicts the share
of vehicle currency invoicing (VCI), the dashed dotted line denotes the euro share, and the thin solid line
represents the euro legacy currencies.
7Figure 2: Vehicle Currency Use in Norwegian Imports from OECD Countries
(a) 29 OECD countries (equally weighted) (b) 29 OECD countries (trade weighted)
Notes: The data pertain to all OECD countries excluding Norway. The rst vertical line indicates the
introduction of the euro in non-cash form, whereas the second vertical line represents the introduction of
the euro in cash transactions. The solid line represents the US dollar (USD) share, the dashed line depicts
the euro (EUR) share, and the dotted line denotes the share of other currencies. Note that before January
1, 2002, the legacy currencies that were used as a vehicle currency are also counted toward the euro share.
8Table 1: Vehicle Currency Shares, 1996 and 2006
Year Currencies Share of All Share of All
Currencies Vehicle Currencies
1996 Total 37.4666 100.0000
US dollar 19.7697 52.7662
Eurozone 12.0287 32.1052
German mark 10.1230 27.0186
Dutch guilder 0.6693 1.7864
Belgian franc 0.4894 1.3062
ECU 0.3444 0.9192
Austrian schilling 0.1645 0.4392
French franc 0.1381 0.3685
Finnish mark 0.0529 0.1411
Lira 0.0258 0.0689
Irish pound 0.0113 0.0302
Spanish peseta 0.0072 0.0193
Portuguese escudo 0.0028 0.0075
Non-eurozone 5.6682 15.1286
Swedish krona 3.4730 9.2697
Danish krone 1.1570 3.0881
Pound sterling 0.7503 2.0026
Swiss franc 0.2421 0.6463
Japanese yen 0.0389 0.1037
Canadian dollar 0.0060 0.0160
Australian dollar 0.0007 0.0018
Iceland krona 0.0001 0.0003
2006 Total 30.9928 100.0000
Euro 14.6061 47.1274
US dollar 12.8751 41.5424
Swedish krona 2.1265 6.8612
Danish krone 0.9188 2.9644
Pound sterling 0.3650 1.1777
Swiss franc 0.0533 0.1721
Japanese yen 0.0237 0.0763
Canadian dollar 0.0175 0.0566
Czech koruna 0.0027 0.0087
Zloty 0.0025 0.0080
Australian dollar 0.0015 0.0047
New Zealand dollar 0.0001 0.0003
Iceland krona 0.0000 0.0001
Notes: The rst column with data presents the average share with respect to all
currencies (including LCI and PCI), whereas the second column shows the average
share with respect to all vehicle currencies.
9forms on the order of 15 percent of all vehicle currencies. During the transition period, the
euro slowly replaces the US dollar. In the middle of the transition period, the euro share|a
mixture of eurozone legacy currencies used as third currencies and the euro|slowly overtakes
the US dollar. Eventually, the euro share settles at 50 percent while the US dollar hovers
at 40 percent. If currency shares are trade weighted, the euro exceeds the US dollar share
already at the beginning of the transition period [Panel (b) of Figure 2], increasing its share
to 80 percent, whereas the US dollar drops to 20 percent.
Table 1 shows that in 1996 the share of other vehicle currencies (i.e., the non-eurozone
currencies excluding the US dollar) consists primarily of the currencies of the two Scandinavian
partner countries (i.e., the Swedish Krone and the Danish Krone), together accounting for
12 percent. However, the share of the Pound Sterling|once a major vehicle currency|is
very small (2 percent). The German mark is the dominant vehicle currency in the eurozone
in 1996 (84 percent of eurozone currencies), followed by the Dutch guilder (5.6 percent). In
2006, the currencies of Scandinavian partner countries (9.8 percent) are still often used next
to the euro and US dollar.
Table 2: Vehicle Currencies Used in Norway's Imports from OECD Countries, 1996{2006
Time Period Eurozone Non-Eurozone United States Total
Max Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max Mean
1996{1998 23.0 16.1 23.0 15.0 22.0 20.7 23.0 15.6
(12.0) (9.1) (13.0) (8.4) (12.0) (11.3) (13.0) (8.8)
1999{2001 22.0 15.8 22.0 15.8 21.0 19.7 22.0 15.9
(12.0) (8.5) (12.0) (7.8) (12.0) (10.0) (12.0) (8.2)
2002{2006 17.0 8.7 18.0 9.1 18.0 13.0 18.0 9.0
Notes: The numbers in between brackets are the number of legacy currencies of the countries participating
in the eurozone. No legacy currencies could be used after January 1, 2002. The group of non-eurozone
countries excludes the United States because the US dollar is a key vehicle currency and would distort the
pattern.
Table 2 shows the actual number of vehicle currencies that traders used in invoicing of
Norwegian imports from OECD countries across three dierent time periods. Before the
abolition of the eurozone legacy currencies, traders invoiced in up to 23 dierent vehicle
currencies, indicating that not all traders resort to currencies with deep exchange markets.
On average, rms in OECD countries employed 16 dierent vehicle currencies. Despite the
role of the US dollar as the world's leading vehicle currency, the United States invoiced its
10exports to Norway in almost 20 other currencies. Even though 12 national currencies of the
eurozone disappeared in 2002, the average number of vehicle currencies used until 2006 only
dropped from 16 to 9. As expected, the number of vehicle currencies employed in the invoicing
of Norwegian imports from eurozone countries declined on average more than in imports from
non-eurozone countries.
4 Empirical Methodology
This section sets out the empirical model that is used to analyze the introduction of the euro
on currency invoicing and discusses potential determinants of currency invoicing.
4.1 The Static Model
A common starting point to model an agent's choice among alternatives is the random utility
framework. In the context of invoicing, a prot maximizing exporting rm chooses the invoic-
ing currency that gives the highest pay-o.12 More formally, we dene the utility functional
of a rm located in partner country n = 1;:::;N choosing currency j 2 f1;:::;Jg in export
transaction i = 1;:::;I and in quarter t = 1;:::;T as:
Uijnt = dn + x0
nt + z0
jnt + "ijnt; (1)
where dn is a 1  N row vector of dummies equal to one in column n and zero otherwise, 
measures a country-specic xed eect, x0
nt is a 1  Hx row vector of explanatory variables
related to country n in each quarter t, z0
jnt is a 1  Hz row vector of explanatory variables
related to currency j = 1;:::;J in each quarter t, which can potentially vary across countries,
"ijnt is the error term, and , , and  are the coecient vectors to be estimated.13 The
error term is assumed to be independent across currency choices, countries, and quarters.
We assume that the underlying data generating process of our sample consists of individual
import transactions i of value mijnt (measured in Norwegian Krones). Ideally, we would like
to know the probability that an exporter in country n chooses currency j in transaction i at
time t, that is,
Pijnt = Prob[Uijnt > Uiknt] 8 k 6= j: (2)
12We are assuming that the rm in the partner country chooses the currency. Alternatively, we could have
assumed that the Norwegian rm is choosing the currency. In practice, the currency choice is the result of
Nash bargaining between the two parties. The theoretical ramications of this is left for further research.
13We do not include the characteristics of the trader. See the discussion below.





Instead of using a zero-one identier to indicate whether a currency is chosen, we calculate J
currency shares in Norwegian imports from partner country n. To this end, we divide mjnt






This strategy takes us into the realm of compositional data, where the currency shares
have to lie in the closed unit interval [0;1], satisfy the adding up constraint, and be correlated
(Appendix A.1). With compositional invoicing data, we assume the utility functional (1) to
be identical across rms, which modies to:
Ujnt = dn + x0
nt + z0
jnt + "jnt; (5)
and yields the probability based on aggregate utility:
Pjnt = Prob[Ujnt > Uknt] 8 k 6= j (6)
= Prob[sjnt = 1jxnt;Znt];
which is the probability that Norwegian imports from country n are invoiced in currency j
and Znt is a J  Hz matrix, representing all currency choices J and their characteristics zj.
Our analysis distinguishes up to 31 currencies. We focus only on currencies of OECD
countries because no other currencies outside the OECD were actually chosen. Furthermore,
it would be computationally demanding to distinguish all currencies in the world. The set of
available currencies in the OECD area varies across time (strictly speaking, we should have
dened Jt), reecting euro introduction.15 After the full-blown introduction of the euro, the
number of currencies drops from 31 to 19. To allow the coecients of the country-specic
variables to dier across currency groups v 2 f1;:::;V g, we split the parameter vectors  and
 by currency group and dene v and v. We distinguish three mutually exclusive currency
groups: the Norwegian Krone (LCI), the partner currency or currencies (PCI), and vehicle
14The inability to dierentiate across transaction sizes in aggregate data has been called the ecological
inference problem. See King (1997).
15The maximum number of currencies across the three relevant time periods is as follows: (i) 30 currencies
of OECD countries and the European Currency Unit (ECU) during the 1996{1998 period; (ii) 30 currencies
of OECD countries and the euro during the 1999{2001 period; and (iii) 19 currencies during the 2002{2006
period.
12currencies (VCI). From the perspective of a single country, PCI consists of one currency for
non-eurozone countries, whereas it includes one or two currencies in the case of eurozone
countries (i.e., one of the legacy currencies or the euro or both). The third group (VCI) is
composed of a large number of third currencies and varies in composition in each bilateral
trading relationship.16 For purposes of analyzing currency-specic variables, all potential
currencies of OECD countries are included in the analysis even though some currencies were
never chosen at all (e.g., the Hungarian forint, the Slovak koruna, the Mexican peso, the
Turkish lira, and Korean won).
Taking account of the currency groups and assuming a logistic distribution, we can write









; j 6= k; v 2 fLCI;PCI;V CIg; (7)
where v and v are the xed eects coecients and the country-specic coecient vector
for currency group v, respectively. This probability-based approach ensures that estimated
probabilities satisfy both the adding-up and unit interval constraint. For identication pur-
poses, we need to set the parameter vectors v and v to zero for one currency group. We






















8 j 6= LCI; v 6= LCI; (9)
implying that the Norwegian Krone is the normalized currency choice.
Our model is a variant of the multinomial logit model, which we call the conditional
compositional multinomial logit (CCML) model (Appendix A.2). Assuming currency choices











16All currency choices, except the Norwegian Krone, can be identied as PCI or VCI depending on Norway's
partner country in trade.
17McFadden's (1974) derivation of the famous conditional logit model is identical to the steps that would
have to be taken to go from (6) to (7).
13where the probabilities are exponentiated by the actual observed currency shares and  
[ PCI V CI PCI V CI]0 is a row vector with parameters. Taking natural logarithms of









To arrive at the coecient vector , equation (11) can be estimated by the maximum like-
lihood method. The estimated probabilities are then the predicted currency shares; that is,
^ Pjnt = ^ sjnt where hats denote predicted values (Appendix A.3). In the benchmark spec-
ication, we explicitly control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries. To this end,
we run a country-specic xed eects model. Because T is larger than N, we do not have
to deal with the well-known incidental parameter problem. As a robustness check, we also
consider a pooled model. For this purpose, we replace dnv by a pooled constant av, which
measures the trader's intrinsic preference for currency group v across countries. The set of
explanatory variables consists of trade variables and monetary variables (Section 4.3). We
use robust standard errors instead of clustered standard errors, reecting the relatively small
N (Appendix A.4).
4.2 The Dynamic Model
Even though the economic characteristics of a country or a currency (e.g., ination and
exchange rate volatility) can dramatically change in a short time period, trading partners
typically stick to the same invoicing currency in settling their trade contracts. This phenom-
ena of habit formation has been dubbed hysteresis in the international nance literature. To
model hysteresis at the aggregate level, we extend model (5) to include the past invoicing
share sjn(t q) for lag q = 1;:::;Q. The dynamic model is given by:18





jnt + jnt; (12)
where q is the coecient for lag q and jnt is the error term. If q > 0, then traders
prefer the same currency in the current period as in the previous period, whereas for q < 0,
invoicing in another currency is preferred in the current period. The inclusion of the lagged
dependent variable can cause inconsistency and bias in estimating a logistic regression model
if the current error jnt is correlated with any lagged dependent variable sjn(t q) (cf. Train,
18Because we only observe aggregate bilateral trade ows, the model can only serve as rough proxy for
hysteresis in currency choice at the rm level.
142003). We nd the correlation between jnt and sjn(t 1) to be around 0.63, which turns out
signicant in a formal test. Therefore, we only consider this specication in the robustness
analysis.
4.3 Explanatory Variables
Because traders are likely to choose currencies according to their characteristics and not only
the attributes of the currency's jurisdiction, we include both currency-specic and country-
specic explanatory variables. The analysis includes dummies to capture the introduction of
the euro and the transition period, a set of trade and trade-related variables, and monetary
variables. A detailed overview of the data sources|and the way the variables are calculated|
is provided in Table A.2, whereas Table A.3 presents descriptive statistics. The following sets
out the explanatory variables used in the analysis.
4.3.1 Euro Dummies
To measure any unobserved eects on invoicing related to euro introduction, for example,
trust in the stability of the common currency, we employ a dummy for countries participating
in the eurozone EURlt for l = fj;ng, where l indicates whether the dummy is currency specic
(denoted by j) or country specic (denoted by n). As a currency-specic variable, the euro
dummy takes on a value of unity for the legacy currencies of the eurozone and the euro
from January 1, 1999 onward and zero otherwise (where the legacy currencies are included
up to December 31, 2001). As a country-specic variable, the dummy takes on a value of
unity for all eurozone countries from January 1, 1999 onward. More euro invoicing because
of a changes in fundamental variables (i.e., a larger world trade share of the eurozone or
more stable ination rates) should be captured suciently by the respective regressors. The
parameter of the euro dummy variable is expected to have a positive sign, since countries will
take advantage of the increased market power bestowed upon them by the euro and trade
less in any other currency than their own.
During the transition period, the euro has been used in non-cash trade transactions along-
side the legacy currencies|which continued to be used as legal tender|and thus did not yet
assume its full weight. To measure the euro eect during the transition period, we use a
dummy variable EuroControljt, which takes on a value of unity for the currency choice of one
of the legacy currencies for the period January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2001 and zero other-
wise. Note that the ocial date on which the national currencies of countries participating
15in the eurozone ceased to be legal tender varied across Member States, but lasted up to a
maximum of two months after January, 2002. Based on the descriptive analysis in Section 3,
we know that the euro slowly replaced the legacy currencies, yielding a negative coecient of
the EuroControljt dummy. The marginal eect of this dummy will indicate the speed of the
transition.
4.3.2 Trade Variables
A country's market share is a key determinant of currency choice (cf. Swoboda, 1968; Bac-
chetta and Van Wincoop, 2005; and Ligthart and Da Silva, 2007). Bacchetta and Van Win-
coop (2005) argue that a larger world trade share increases a country's market power and thus
its ability to impose its currency upon the trading partner. Country size itself plays no role.
The eect of a country's world trade share WorldTradelt is expected to be positive for PCI
relative to invoicing in the Norwegian Krone (LCI). Because the need to use an international
currency is reduced, the eect on VCI should be negative.
McKinnon (1979) argues that homogeneous products|which are typically traded on orga-
nized exchanges (e.g., oil)|are often priced and invoiced in leading vehicle currencies like the
US dollar and the euro. Rauch (1999) distinguishes homogeneous products from reference-
priced products, which are not traded on organized exchanges, but for which \reference prices"
are available. Hence, rms cannot set their own price. In addition, referenced-priced goods
are also likely to be xed to a \reference currency" (usually a vehicle currency). Therefore,
the share of reference-priced goods in Norwegian imports from country n (Ref nt) is expected
to have a positive eect on VCI and a negative eect on LCI and PCI. It is generally assumed
that rms producing dierentiated goods under monopolistic competition have power to set
freely their prices and choose their currency of denomination. McKinnon (1979) argues that
dierentiated products are therefore more likely to be invoiced in the producer's currency.
However, Krugman (1987) and Betts and Devereux (2000) point out that rms producing
dierentiated nal goods have an incentive to \price to market." As a result, the share of
dierentiated products Di nt is expected to have a negative eect on VCI and an ambiguous
eect on LCI and PCI.
To control for the composition of trade across countries, the partner country's share in total
Norwegian trade NorwayTradent is included. This variable captures the net eect on bilateral
trade of distance (negative eect) and a country's GDP (positive eect). NorwayTradent is not
likely to aect the preferences for either country's currency and, therefore, has an ambiguous
16eect on the trading partners' own currency shares (i.e., PCI and LCI). The eect on VCI,
however, is expected to be negative. Indeed, if goods markets of two economies are becoming
more integrated there will be less need for a third currency.
4.3.3 Monetary Variables
Magee and Rao (1980) hypothesize that trading rms are less likely to set their prices in
currencies of countries that exhibit a high rate of ination. A high ination rate weakens a
country's currency and erodes the real value of the rm's trade receipts. The expected rate of
ination of the partner country CPI lt should have a negative eect on PCI by foreign exporters
and on LCI by Norwegian exporters. Cornell (1980) and Devereux, Engel, and Storgaard
(2004) argue that the expected volatility of ination of the partner country CPIVollt will
similarly have a negative eect on use of the partner currency, because risk-averse exporters
(importers) will want to minimize the variance of their receipts (payments).
According to Swoboda (1968), traders prefer a currency that has a thick foreign exchange
market. Because of the smallness of a risk-averse trader relative to the market (atomicity),
the risk of capital loss in a thick market is smaller than in a thin market. Krugman (1980) and
Magee and Rao (1980) elaborate formally on the role of the lower transaction costs in deep,
resilient markets. Therefore, the size of the foreign exchange market of the chosen currency
SizeFX lt on the respective is expected to be positive.
Baron (1976) was the rst to argue that exporters will prefer to invoice in the currency
whose relative price has the least volatility with a view to avoid revenue risk. The expected
(nominal) exchange rate volatility between the chosen currency and the Norwegian Krone
XVoltoNOK lt is expected to decrease the share of the chosen currency, regardless whether
this currency happens to be the producer's, local or a vehicle currency.19 Similarly, the
expected exchange rate volatility between the chosen currency and the producer's currency
XVoltoProdjnt is expected to decrease the share of the chosen currency, again regardless of
the currency type.20
19Note that the change in the nominal exchange rate is not included, since the shares have already been
adjusted for exchange rate dierences across years.
20By construction XVoltoNOK lt and XVoltoProdjnt are zero for LCI and PCI, respectively. XVoltoProdjnt
is also the only variable that varies across currencies and countries.
174.4 Structural Break Test
Because our analysis covers the time period of the introduction of the euro, we have included
the euro dummy EURjt discussed above. Imposing the euro dummy to start in the year 1999
represents the belief that a major change in invoicing practices materialized then. However, it
is not a priori clear whether and (if so) when such a structural break occurred. In particular,
in view of the hysteresis in invoicing practices, the structural break is likely to take place later
(if it occurred at all). Therefore, we perform a structural break test with unknown change
point.
Formal tests for nonlinear models with an unknown change point have been devised and
discussed by Andrews (1993). A model is said to exhibit parameter stability if the null
hypothesis of no structural break:
H0 : t = 0 for all t  1; (13)
cannot be rejected. The alternative hypothesis of a structural change is given by:




1() for t = 1;:::;T
2() for t = T + 1;:::
; (14)
where  2 (0;1) denotes the probability of a one-o structural change at date T and 1()
and 2() denote the parameter before and after the structural change, respectively. Searching
for the point of change can be approached in two ways. First, the point of change is known
on a restricted interval   (0;1), where  denotes the time period under consideration. In
our case, the time span relates to the transition period from the introduction of the euro in
non-cash form in 1999 to the introduction of euro coins and notes in 2002. We thus specify
 = [13=44;25=44], where 13 is the rst quarter of 1999, 25 is the last quarter of 2001, and
44 denotes the total number of quarters. Second, if one assumes the absence of information
regarding the time of change, all change points are of interest on the (0;1) interval. However,
since the proposed likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic diverges to innity at the extreme points
of 0 and 1, Andrews (1993) suggests to only use the restricted interval  = [0:15;0:85]. In
our model, this would imply the interval  = [7=44;37=44]. The sup2 LRT() is calculated
as follows:
maxf 2[LL(U)   LL(R; 8 tT)   LL(R; 8 t>T)]g 8 T 2 ; (15)
where LL denotes the log-likelihood and R and U denote the restricted model and unrestricted
18model, respectively. If the sup2 LRT() is larger than the critical value21 then the null
hypothesis of no structural break can be rejected.
5 Results
This section presents the results. We start o with the benchmark specication, including
the variables discussed above, and subsequently present a robustness analysis.
5.1 Benchmark Specication
The rst column of Table 3 sets out the xed eects benchmark model. 22 Within the set of
currency-specic variables only the euro dummies EURjt and EuroControljt are signicant
and have the expected sign. After the introduction of the euro, eurozone currencies are
chosen more frequently and the legacy currencies of the eurozone are chosen less often in the
transition period. The size of the foreign exchange market SizeFX jt is not signicant. In
addition, both exchange rate volatility variables (i.e., XVoltoNOK jt and XVoltoProdjnt) are
not signicant, which might be explained by the nature of the data; we only observe aggregate
currency shares and thus cannot track currency use in single transactions. In this context,
large transactions of large rms may outweigh many small transactions of small rms,23 which
often do not have access to sophisticated nancial products to hedge exchange rate risk.24
Within the set of country-specic variables, the variables CPI nt, CPIVolnt, and Di nt
are signicant and also have the expected sign. The exporter's currency is chosen less if its
economy's ination volatility is higher and a vehicle currency is chosen less if the exporter's
ination rate is higher.25 The share of vehicle currencies also decreases if the export package
of Norway's trading partner consists of more dierentiated products, which is in line with the
21Asymptotic critical values for up to 20 parameters are provided by Andrews (1993). However, since our
benchmark specication is a xed eects model with 73 parameters, we calculate the asymptotic critical values
using Andrews's GAUSS code.
22We formally tested whether we should employ a xed eects or a pooled specication. Using the likelihood
ratio test under the null hypothesis that the pooled model and the xed eects model are statistically the
same, yields:  2[LL(av)   LL(dnv)] = 241:97 > 39:8 = 
2(56), where I and II denote Specication I
(the benchmark) and Specication II, respectively. Because there are 29 countries in the analysis, we have
2  28 = 56 restrictions. The test statistic indicates that the hypothesis of poolability across countries can be
rejected, that is, the xed eects model is more suitable.
23The diculty of dierentiating between large transactions and small transactions is an example of the
ecological inference problem as dened in equation (5).
24Borsum and Odegaard (2005) survey Norwegian rms about their currency hedging practices and nd that
small rms use more primitive hedging methods such as invoicing in the home currency, whereas large rms
use forward contracts and currency options.
25Ligthart and Da Silva (2007) also included this variable in their analysis, but it was not signicant in the
benchmark specication.
19Table 3: Results for Specications I{IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Currency Specic
EUR 0.1748*** 0.3235*** 0.1186*** 0.0942***
(0.0223) (0.0221) (0.0299) (0.0213)
EuroControl -0.1403*** -0.1947*** -0.1855*** -0.1858***
(0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0368) (0.0244)
SizeFX 0.0009 0.0111*** 0.0010
(0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0008)
XVoltoNOK 0.5087 -0.7727* 0.3965 0.6307
(0.3679) (0.4555) (0.3905) (0.4070)
XVoltoProd -0.6490 0.1493 -0.8816*** -0.1690












CPI -0.0492 -0.1960*** ( ) -0.0223 -0.0988*** ( )
(0.0321) (0.0245) (0.0278) (0.0292)




WorldTrade 0.0037 0.0288 0.0039 0.0031
(0.1819) (0.0473) (0.2120) (0.1967)
NorwayTrade 0.0131 0.1050*** (+) 0.0142 0.0110
(0.0541) (0.0090) (0.0546) (0.0539)
Di -0.0119 -0.0131*** ( ) -0.0139* -0.0159**




CPI -0.0136*** 0.0037** (+) -0.0132*** -0.0154***
(0.0036) (0.0016) (0.0038) (0.0037)




WorldTrade -0.0010 0.0081 -0.0009 -0.0008
(0.2025) (0.0336) (0.2293) (0.2035)
NorwayTrade -0.0093 -0.0081*** ( ) -0.0102 -0.0080
(0.0652) (0.0336) (0.0672) (0.0668)
Di -0.0351*** ( ) -0.0811** -0.0338*** ( ) -0.0347*** ( )
(0.0057) (0.0102) (0.0066) (0.0058)
Constant -3.1138*** ( )
(0.1278)
Observations 1,276 1,276 1,160 1,276
Log-likelihood -2,493.17 -2,614.15 -2,252.63 -2,491.57
Pseudo R2 0.39 0.36 0.39 0.39
Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of currency j being chosen. Traders can choose from three currencies
(PCI, LCI, and VCI), where we have normalized the coecients of the country-specic variables for LCI. The top
panel reports estimated coecients of currency-specic variables, whereas the bottom panels report country-specic
variables. ***, **, * denote signicance at the 1, 5 or 10 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses below the parameter estimates. All signicant marginal eects are given by a (+) or ( ),
indicating the direction of the eect. The identied marginal eects are all signicant at the 1 percent level, except
the ones that have a y, which are signicant at the 5 percent level.
20stylized fact identied by McKinnon (1979). Finally, the pseudo R2 of the benchmark model
is almost 0.4, which is rather high within the class of logit models.
In nonlinear models, the slope coecients do not have the same interpretation as in
linear models. Using average marginal eects, we can also interpret the magnitudes of the
eects of the covariates on invoicing shares. The left panel of Table 4 presents the marginal
eects for country-specic variables in the benchmark specication. Note that the signs and
signicance of the estimated coecients of the country-specic variables can dier from those
in the marginal eects analysis because the marginal eect of a covariate and its standard
error are calculated using the estimated coecients and their respective standard errors of
the other currency groups as well (Appendix A.5). An increase of one standard deviation in
the ination volatility of the exporter's economy reduces PCI by 10.7 percent and increases
the use of the local currency and vehicle currencies by 6.8 and 3.9 percent, respectively.26 The
magnitudes of the ination rate across currency groups are small and statistically insignicant
for all three currency groups. A 10 percent increase in the share of dierentiated products
decreases the use of vehicle currencies by 5 percent.
The right panel of Table 4 presents the marginal eects of signicant currency-specic
variables. Figures on the diagonal of each matrix represent the own eect and gures o
the diagonal denote cross eects (i.e., with respect to the other two currency groups). If
the currency is the euro, then its share increases by 1.4 percent when used as a producer
currency, whereas if it is chosen as a vehicle currency its share increases by 1.6 percent.27
Interestingly, if the Norwegian Krone were part of the eurozone, its share would increase by
almost 2 percent (see the rst entry on the diagonal for the EURjt dummy). The coecient
of EuroControljt indicates the speed of transition from the national legacy currency to the
euro or any other currency. If the exporter's currency is a currency of the eurozone, then it
reduces its invoicing share of the national legacy currency in any quarter between 1999 and
2001 by 1.1 percent and as a vehicle currency by 1.3 percent.
5.2 Robustness Analysis
To check for robustness, we drop the xed eects and analyze a pooled model (Specica-
tion II). Compared to the benchmark, the set of signicant variables expands. Within the
26Those magnitudes are very large, since we have already controlled for unobserved heterogeneity. Table 5
presents the magnitudes for the pooled model. See Section 5.2.
27The marginal eects are usually small in logit models, because the estimated probabilities are bounded
between zero and one.
21Table 4: Average Marginal Eects for the Benchmark Specication
Country Specic Currency Specic
LCI EUR
LCI PCI VCI
CPI 0.0061* LCI 0.0196*** -0.0088*** -0.0108**
(0.0032) (0.0044) (0.0020) (0.0055)
CPIVol 0.0678*** PCI 0.0141*** -0.0052***
(0.0127) (0.0032) (0.0017)




CPI -0.0066 LCI -0.0143*** 0.0062*** 0.0158
(0.0048) (0.0029) (0.0013) (0.0097)
CPIVol -0.1068*** PCI -0.0108*** 0.0045***
(0.0200) (0.0022) (0.0015)









Notes: The left-hand side gives the marginal eects for the country-specic variables,
whereas the right-hand side presents the marginal eects for the currency-specic variables.
The latter panel presents on the diagonal the elasticities with respect to the own currency
group and reports o-diagonal the elasticities with respect to the other currency group
(i.e., PCI, LCI, and VCI). ***, **, * denote signicance at the 1, 5 or 10 percent level,
respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the parameter
estimates. A y indicates that we have averaged the EuroControl dummy across all n
countries and t = 1999Q1;:::;2001Q4 (i.e., the transition period).
22set of currency-specic variables, SizeFX jt becomes signicant with the correct sign. Nor-
wayTradent, a country-specic variable, now turns signicant and has the correct sign too.
The coecient of NorwayTradent for vehicle currencies indicates that there is less need for
a vehicle currency as trade between two economies increases. Di nt is signicant and has a
negative sign, pointing toward LCI by foreign exporters. To save on space, we use a (+) or
( ) in Table 3 to indicate the sign of signicant marginal eects for country-specic variables.
We can see that the signs of the signicant parameters are in line with those of the marginal
eects. Pooling the model reduces the explanatory power somewhat.
We investigate habit formation by running a dynamic model (Specication III), which
extends the xed eects benchmark specication by including the invoicing shares of the
currency groups during the last four quarters. The invoicing share of the previous quarter
is signicant and positive, supporting the presence of \habit formation" in invoicing in the
short run. In the medium to long run, there is no indication of hysteresis. The set of signif-
icant variables|and the sign of the marginal eects|is roughly in line with the benchmark
outcome. Interestingly, XVoltoProdjnt turns out to be signicant with the expected sign,
implying that the foreign exporter chooses a currency that is less volatile relative to its home
currency.
One could argue that producers from a country in which the currency has a deep and
resilient foreign exchange market prefer their own currency. Consequently, they choose less
often a vehicle currency. We could also test whether traders choose a currency that has the
least ination volatility. Specifying ination volatility as a currency-specic variable models
the ination volatility of the producer's currency relative to any other country's ination
volatility, including Norway's.28 To test these two propositions, the size of foreign exchange
market enters the equation as a country-specic variable and ination volatility becomes a
currency-specic variable (Specication IV). We see that both SizeFX nt and CPIVoljt are
signicant. If the producer's currency has a large foreign exchange market, its currency is
invoiced more often and the share of vehicle currencies decreases. A currency is chosen less if
the ination volatility of its economy increases.
Because Specication IV yields various new signicant variables, we also report average
marginal eects (Table 5). Ination volatility as currency-specic variable CPIVoljt has
rather small magnitudes across currency groups. An increase of Norway's ination volatility
by one standard deviation reduces the invoicing share of the Norwegian Krone by less than
28Devereux, Engel, and Storgaard (2004) argue that a country's ination volatility only matters with respect
to its trading partner's ination volatility.
23Table 5: Average Marginal Eects for the Robust Specication IV
Country Specic Currency Specic
LCI EUR
LCI PCI VCI
CPI 0.0109*** LCI 0.0196*** -0.0088*** -0.0108**
(0.0028) (0.0044) (0.0020) (0.0055)
SizeFX -0.0018** PCI 0.0141*** -0.0052***
(0.0009) (0.0032) (0.0017)




CPI -0.0137*** LCI -0.0187*** 0.0085*** 0.0101***
(0.0043) (0.0024) (0.0011) (0.0037)
SizeFX 0.0060*** PCI -0.0144*** 0.0058***
(0.0007) (0.0018) (0.0014)




CPI 0.0028 LCI -0.0063*** 0.0028*** 0.0034**
(0.0020) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0016)
SizeFX -0.0042*** PCI -0.0045*** 0.0017***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0005)
Di -0.0050*** VCI -0.0051***
(0.0013) (0.0012)
Notes: The left-hand side gives the marginal eects for the country-specic variables,
whereas the right-hand side presents the marginal eects for the currency-specic variables.
The latter panel presents on the diagonal the elasticities with respect to the own currency
group and reports o-diagonal the elasticities with respect to the other currency group
(i.e., PCI, LCI, and VCI). ***, **, * denote signicance at the 1, 5 or 10 percent level,
respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the parameter
estimates. A y indicates that we have averaged the EuroControl dummy across all n
countries and t = 1999Q1;:::;2001Q4 (i.e., the transition period).
24one percent. The same increase of the exporter's ination volatility reduces his own currency's
invoicing share by less than half of a percent. A 10 percent increase in the size of the partner
currency's foreign exchange market SizeFX nt leads to an increase of 6 percent of the producer
currency's share, a fall of almost 2 percent of the local currency share, and a decrease of around
4 percent of vehicle currencies. A similar 10 percent increase of dierentiated products Di nt
leads to a 5 percent increase (decrease) of local currency (vehicle) currencies, respectively.
Rather large is the magnitude of the ination eect; an increase of 10 percent of the producer's
country ination rate causes an almost 14 percent loss of the producer's currency share and
increases the local currency share by almost 11 percent.
Table 6 presents additional robustness checks. Specication V shows the benchmark model
without the euro dummy EURjt. XVoltoProdjnt turns signicant with the correct negative
sign while it was insignicant in the benchmark. It could be argued that choosing the euro
reduces the eect of exchange rate volatility with respect to the exporter's currency, an eect
that is captured when the euro dummy is included. Specication VI modies the benchmark
model by replacing the share of dierentiated products Di nt with the share of reference-
priced products Ref nt. Increasing the share of reference-priced products decreases the use
of the exporter's currency. Specication VII takes CPI jt, CPIVoljt, and WorldTradejt as
currency-specic variables. CPI jt is signicant, but has an incorrect (positive) sign. World-
Tradejt is insignicant, in line with its insignicance as a currency-specic variable.
Table 7 presents specications with country-specic variables only.29 Specication VIII
shows a pooled model, which resembles the approach taken by the rest of the invoicing
literature. All trade variables|including the control variable NorwayTradent|are signicant,
in line with the ndings of other authors (cf. Ligthart and Da Silva, 2007). Ination and
ination volatility both are signicantly negative in case of PCI, whereas the size of the
foreign exchange market has a negatively signicant eect on VCI. The marginal eects
of all variables|except that of Di nt in VCI|are signicant and have the correct sign.
Specication IX implements country xed eects and nds a smaller set of signicant variables
than in the previous specication. However, the euro dummy is signicant and has the correct
sign for both PCI and VCI.
29We can no longer distinguish between the EUR and EuroControl dummies, because the latter is a currency-
specic variable.





EuroControl -0.0890*** -0.1457*** -0.1909***
(0.0269) (0.0288) (0.0328)






XVoltoNOK 0.1157 0.3844 -0.2214
(0.3825) (0.3563) (0.4392)





CPI -0.0569 -0.0609* ( )
(0.0337) (0.0349)

















NorwayTrade -0.0089 -0.0327 -0.0063
(0.0671) (0.0646) (0.0654)




Observations 1,276 1,276 1,276
Log-likelihood -2495.3 -2490.04 -2506.36
Pseudo R2 0.39 0.39 0.39
Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of currency j being chosen. Traders can
choose from three currencies (PCI, LCI, and VCI), where we have normalized the coecients
of the country-specic variables for LCI. The top panel reports estimated coecients of
currency-specic variables, whereas the bottom panels report country-specic variables. ***,
**, * denote signicance at the 1, 5 or 10 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses below the parameter estimates. All signicant marginal eects
are given by a (+) or ( ), indicating the direction of the eect. The identied marginal
eects are all signicant at the 1 percent level, except the ones that have a y, which are
signicant at the 5 percent level.
26Table 7: Results for Specications VIII{IX
(VIII) (IX)
Country Specic: PCI
CPI -0.1971*** ( ) -0.0372
(0.0248) (0.0268)






XVoltoNOK -4.9860** ( ) 1.8927
(2.3293) (1.3520)
WorldTrade 0.6421*** (+) 0.0321
(0.0689) (0.1332)
NorwayTrade 0.0495*** (+) 0.0541
(0.0080) (0.0428)
Di -0.0191*** ( ) 0.0006
(0.0027) (0.0052)





CPI -0.0004 (+) 0.0044* (+)
y
(0.0024) (0.0023)
CPIVol 0.0051 (+) -0.0051 (+)
(0.0165) (0.0140)
SizeFX -0.0295*** ( ) 0.0080
(0.0049) (0.0070)
XVoltoNOK 4.4040*** (+) 0.4965
(1.0426) (0.6026)
WorldTrade 0.4941*** (+) -0.0065
(0.0554) (0.1239)












Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of currency j being chosen.
Traders can choose from three currencies (PCI, LCI, and VCI), where we
have normalized the coecients of the country-specic variables for LCI. The
top panel reports estimated coecients of currency-specic variables, whereas
the bottom panels report country-specic variables. ***, **, * denote signif-
icance at the 1, 5 or 10 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses below the parameter estimates. All signicant
marginal eects are denoted by a (+) or ( ), indicating the direction of the
eect. The identied marginal eects are all signicant at the 1 percent level,
except the ones with a y, which are signicant at the 5 percent level.
275.3 Structural Break Test
Figure 3 presents the LR test statistic of a structural change for various model specications.
Panel (a) shows that the test statistic reaches its maximum in 2002, but does not indicate a
structural change at the 10 percent level of signicance. Even though the descriptive analysis
of Section 3 revealed a major change in invoicing practices, the model and its signicant
covariates|i.e., EUR, EuroControl, CPIVol, CPI, and Di |account well enough for these
changes. Panel (b) is using specication V without the euro dummy. The statistic touches
the 10 percent level of signicance in 2001, indicating that the euro dummy controls for the
break to a certain degree. Panel (c) is based on Specication II, which is the pooled version
of the benchmark model. The test statistic indicates a break in 2001 at the 5 percent level
and is above the 10 percent level for around ve quarters from 2001Q1 onward.
5.4 The Eect of the Euro on Individual Countries and the Eurozone
To get insight into the euro eect on currency shares of individual countries, we calculate
marginal eects at a representative value of the covariate of interest. We select three eurozone
countries, that is, Germany, Greece, and Italy. Germany is chosen because it is a country
with a low ination volatility, whereas Greece and Italy feature high ination volatilities. We
also compute what would have happened if selected non-eurozone countries (e.g., Canada,
Japan, and the United States) had adopted the euro. We choose Canada to measure the
eect the euro has on a country that trades predominantly with the United States. Japan is
included because it is marked as an outlier in the invoicing literature, owing to its relatively
low share of PCI.30 Finally, the United States is interesting due to the US dollar's vehicle
currency role, which yields a high share of PCI in Norwegian imports (Table A.1). To check
for the robustness of the euro eect across time, we also compute the counterfactual of euro
introduction in the last quarter of 1998.
Table 8 reports the marginal eects of the countries in question in the last quarter of 1998
and 2006. The euro dummy captures the direct (unobserved) eect of euro introduction; it
is signicant in all three eurozone countries, but there is not much of a dierence between
1996 and 2006. Above and beyond the eects of the covariates, Greece and Italy|and the
Mediterranean countries in the eurozone more generally (not reported)|beneted the most in
30Japan tends to invoice its exports in the local currency to a much greater extent than would be expected
given its economic size. This invoicing pattern can be explained by Japan's small market share in world trade.
In addition, more than half of Japan's exports to OECD countries go to the United States and this biases the
invoicing decision toward the US dollar.
28Figure 3: Likelihood Ratio Test Statistic of a Structural Change, 1999{2004
Panel (a): Including Euro Dummy (Fixed Eects Model)
Panel (b): Excluding Euro Dummy (Fixed Eects Model)
Panel (c): Including Euro Dummy (Pooled Model)
Notes: Panel (a) is based on Specication I of Table 3, whereas Panels (b) and (c) are based on Specication
V of Table 6 and Specication II of Table 3, respectively. The solid line represents the test statistic, the big
dashed line is the 1 percent level of signicance, the small dashed line denotes the 5 percent level of signicance,




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































302006 from having adopted the euro. In the case of Canada, the euro dummy is not signicant.
If Japan were part of the eurozone, it would have increased PCI by nearly 2 percent in 1998
and almost 3 percent in 2006, which is smaller than for eurozone countries. If the United
States were to adopt the euro, its currency share in 2006 would have gone up as much as that
of Germany. These results indicate that the introduction of the euro also would have had an
impact outside the European continent.
Part of the euro eect may have manifested itself indirectly through its benecial eect
on price and ination stability. When Greece joined the euro, it boosted its PCI immediately
via the unobserved euro eect, but also enjoyed an increase in its PCI share via a reduction
in ination volatility. In 1998, Greece has (in absolute terms) a smaller marginal eect of
ination volatility than Germany and Italy, even though Greece's ination volatility is as
high as that of Italy. A one standard deviation increase of ination volatility decreases PCI
of Germany, Greece, and Italy by 17 percent, 14 percent, and 18 percent, respectively. In
2006, when all three countries were part of the eurozone, Germany's marginal eect is -14
percent and that of Greece is -17 percent.31 CPIVolnt is not signicant with respect to the
invoicing of the Canadian dollar, but it is signicant with respect to VCI and LCI (the latter
is not reported in the table), where the former has a magnitude of 0.1.
We investigate to what extent the increase in the PCI share of eurozone countries can be
attributed to a change in the fundamentals. Ination volatility in the eurozone|measured
as the standard deviation of ination|dropped from 0.5 in 1998Q4 to 0.25 in 2006Q4. Using
ination volatility data for 1998Q4, we derive the predicted PCI share of eurozone countries
in 2006Q4 if the volatilities were still as high as in the late 1990s. We nd that the predicted
PCI share drops from 0.46 (when 2006Q4 data are used for all controls) to 0.33 (when 1998Q4
ination volatility data are used while all other controls are set at 2006Q4 values), suggesting
that the drop in ination volatility played a large role in the rise in the PCI share after euro
introduction.
6 Conclusions
The paper analyzes the eect of euro introduction on invoicing currency choice. We use a
conditional compositional multinomial logit approach, in which trader's invoicing motives can
31Greece's PCI share is low in 1998 (on the order of 3 percent) and rather high in 2006 (roughly 65 percent).
In view of these PCI shares, an increase of Greece's ination volatility could possibly not reduce its invoicing
in producer currencies much more in 1998, but there is more room in 2006. Given that Greece has a greater
PCI share in more recent years might make it more prone to ination volatility.
31be directly linked to the attributes of the currencies rather than to countries' characteristics
only. To this end, we use quarterly panel data on invoicing of Norwegian imports from OECD
countries covering the period 1996{2006. We test the stability of our model using Andrews's
structural change test with an unknown breakpoint.
In the descriptive analysis, we show that eurozone exporters have increased their home
currency share at the expense of both local and vehicle currencies. The euro has replaced the
US dollar as the dominant currency in the group of vehicle currencies. In the econometric
analysis|after having controlled for unobserved country heterogeneity and changes in the
fundamentals|we nd that the euro has had a signicant positive eect on the euro share
(as well as the shares of producer and vehicle currencies). In addition, ination volatility
is shown to be signicant and negatively aects a partner country's currency share. Other
signicant variables (taking the benchmark model) are the ination rate and the degree of
product dierentiation. In alternative specications, we nd the size of the foreign exchange
market and the invoicing share in the previous quarter to have a signicantly positive eect on
the respective currency shares, whereas the share of eurozone legacy currencies is signicantly
negative. We derive average marginal eects and nd that the drop in ination volatility has
boosted producer currency invoicing by eurozone countries the most, followed by the unob-
served eect of euro introduction. Conditional on the fundamentals, the producer currency
shares of Mediterranean countries in the eurozone enjoyed the highest increase from euro
adoption. Last but not least, the structural break test supports the stability of our model
parameters. Although the test statistic shows a peak around the time of euro introduction,
it does not exceed the 10 percent level of signicance.
Future research could focus on invoicing transactions at the rm level, potentially via a
survey of eurozone rms. Such a micro-based approach has the advantage that information on
rm size and transaction volumes can be used in the analysis. Second, to check the robustness
of the ndings, invoicing data for other countries than Norway could be analyzed. Finally,
the currency of invoicing is largely settled through negotiations between the exporting and
importing rm. A dynamic cooperative bargaining model would have to be developed to
capture these interactions.
32Appendix
A.1 Properties of Compositional Data
Compositional data with extreme values|i.e., observations that can attain values at the
extremes of the [0;1] interval|can be dened by the following properties (cf. Aitchison,
1986).
(i) Boundedness: Each currency share is bounded within the closed unit interval; that is,
0  sjnt  1;
(ii) Adding-up constraint: All the currency shares for a given country n at a given quarter
t add up to unity; that is,
PJ
j=1 sjnt = 1; and






(for j 6= k) of the same country n and within the same time period t have the same
denominator
PJ
j mjnt, implying that Cov(sjnt;sknt) 6= 0.
A.2 The Conditional CML Approach
Papke and Wooldridge (1996) propose a fractional logit approach to estimate a compositional
data model with two alternative choices. They estimate the model using the method of quasi-
maximum likelihood, which involves applying the Gauss-Newton procedure to the scores of
the Bernoulli log-likelihood. We extend this approach by using more than two alternatives,
thereby creating a multinomial version of the fractional logit. In addition, by using currency
shares as dependent variable, we enter into the domain of compositional data (Appendix A.1).
The typical fractional logit model type would only use \alternative-invariant" regressors,
which are in our case country-specic variables. For conceptual purposes, we extend the
method to \alternative-varying" regressors (i.e., currency-specic variables), which we call
the conditional compositional multinomial logit approach. However, once we incorporate
alternative-varying regressors, the likelihood does not have the simple scores as in the case
of the multinomial extension of the fractional logit (see equations (A.3){(A.4) of Appendix
A.3).32 By including currency-specic variables, the model becomes much more complex.
Instead of simply summing across the three currency groups, we distinguish 31 dierent
32The simple compositional multinomial logit model (with country-specic variables only) can be computed
using Stata's pweight command in combination with mlogit. We programmed the CCML approach using
Matlab.
33currencies. Note that our currency set is time-varying; for example, the ECU and euro legacy
currencies are dropped over time, whereas the euro is introduced.
With respect to inference, we treat each country n at quarter t as a single observation.
However, as we split each real observation on our dependent variable into all the possible
currency choices j, the number of observations expands, yielding a maximum of 32,944.
As a result, roughly 50 percent of the dependent variable sjvnt contains zeros. Because
nonlinear least squares assigns too much weight to the zero observations, we maximize the
log-likelihood function directly using a Quasi-Newton method, ignoring the zero shares in
estimation and using the characteristics of the zero observations within the probabilities of
the nonzero observations.
The CCML approach captures properties (i) and (ii) of Appendix A.1. However, the
correlation property is not taken into account, because the logistic distribution assumes that
observations are independently distributed, that is, the error terms "jnt and "knt of equation
(5) for j 6= k are assumed to be uncorrelated. The unobserved correlation might not only
be within the unobserved mean, but also within the covariates itself. Unobserved correlation
among alternatives has also been an issue in discrete choice logit models. The restricted
substitution patterns implied by the logit model class has been called the independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property.33
A.3 Asymptotic Equivalence of Predicted and Actual Shares
We know from maximum likelihood theory that the expected value of the score at the true
parameter value  is zero:






is the observation's score and  is the parameter vector. The observation's score with respect
to the currency-specic vector  is:
@
PJ
j=1 sjnt ln ^ Pjnt
@
= Z0
nt(snt   ^ Pnt); (A.3)
33Mixed logit models allow exible correlation patterns among discrete alternatives (cf. Train, 2003), but are
computationally very expensive to implement in the CCML context because of the already high dimensionality
of the compositional data. Alternatively, we could have used the logistic-normal distribution. This type of
model, however, does not allow extreme values, that is, shares can only lie within the open unit interval (0;1).
34where both vectors snt and ^ Pnt have dimension J  1. The observation's score with respect
to the country-specic vector v is:34
@
PJ





(sjnt   ^ Pjnt); (A.4)
where Jv is the number of currencies in currency group v. Since Znt and xnt are non-zero,
equality (A.1) only holds true when sjnt = ^ Pjnt for all j.
A.4 The Robust Covariance Matrix
In constructing the covariance matrix, we adopt Papke and Wooldridge's (1996) line of rea-
soning. The parameters v and  are consistent provided that









holds, satisfying 0 < P(sjnt = 1jxnt;Znt) < 1. However, Var(sjntjxntv;Znt) is unlikely to
be constant when 0  sjnt  1. Papke and Wooldridge (1996) suggest to use an asymptotically
robust covariance matrix:
V = H 1BH 1; (A.6)
where H 1 is the inverse Hessian matrix and B is the average outer product or the variance








gnt(^ )gnt(^ )0: (A.7)
Papke and Wooldridge (2008) have pointed out that in the case of panel data cluster-robust
errors should be used to control for serial correlation. However, we only have 29 clusters,
which is of insucient size to use cluster-robust standard errors. Indeed, Cameron, Gelbach,
and Miller (2010) argue that at least 50 clusters are needed for accurate inference. Instead,
we follow K ezdi (2004), who nds that the sandwich robust estimator works well when the
cross-sectional sample size is not especially large relative to the time-series dimension.
A.5 Average Marginal Eects
In nonlinear models like ours, the marginal eect does not equal the slope coecients of the
regression equation. The marginal eect measures the eect of a change in the regressor
34The scores used by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) are a special case of equation (A.4) with J = 2 and no
currency groups; that is, xnt(sjnt   ^ Pjnt).
35on the conditional probability that a currency is chosen with unit probability. There are
dierent ways to measure marginal eects because they vary with the point of evaluation.
The most common form is the marginal eect at the sample mean of the regressors,35 which
is a rough measure of the sign of the coecient, but its magnitude is hardly interpretable.
Alternatively, for policy analysis, using the average marginal eect is more meaningful. For
currency-specic variables, the average marginal eect for currency group v is calculated by










where ^ Pvnt =
PJv
j ^ Pjnt is the predicted group share summed across the predicted currency
shares in the given group v with Jv currencies. In view of the large number of currencies,
identifying every marginal eect with respect to all currencies would not be very mean-
ingful. We therefore make inferences with respect to the currencies grouped according to
v = fLCI;PCI;V CIg as we have explained in Section 4. Equation (A.8) shows the change
in the probability of choosing currency currency group v when the r-th currency-specic ex-
planatory variable increases by one unit for currency group k does not change for the other










which represents the change in the predicted share of currency group v when the r-th country-
specic explanatory variable increases by one unit.
Because logit probabilities have closed-form solutions, the marginal eects for (A.8) can







^ Pvnt(1   ^ Pknt)^ r; (A.10)







( ^ Pvnt)^ Pknt^ r; (A.11)
when k 6= v.
35This marginal eect can be computed in Stata by using the command mfx.
36Because of the convex nature of the exponential function, the average eect across agents diers from the
eect for the average agent. Papke and Wooldridge (2008) also use average marginal eects to make inference
about the magnitude of regressors. However, they call them average partial eects.
36In the case of a dummy variable d, such as EURjt and EuroControljt, the average marginal








^ Pvnt(jd = 1)   ^ Punt(jd = 0)
i
; (A.12)








^ Pvnt(jd = 1)   ^ Pknt(jd = 0)
i
; (A.13)
when k 6= v. To arrive at the marginal eect of EuroControljt, we average across the transition
period only.
The average marginal eects for the explanatory variables inform us directly about the
average increase in the currency share, since the estimated probabilities are the predicted
currency shares. To compute the marginal eect at a representative value of a covariate for a
particular currency group (Table 8), we use the choice probabilities for the respective currency
group, country, and time period. The marginal eects will be as displayed in (A.10){(A.13),
but without averaging across time periods and countries.
37Table A.1: Norwegian Import and Currency Shares by Country, Averages for 1996{2006
Rank Countries Import Accumulated share PCI
share All countries OECD
1 Sweden 15.423 15.423 15.423 45.405
2 Germany 13.857 29.280 29.280 73.791
3 United Kingdom 7.970 37.250 37.250 43.166
4 Denmark 7.215 44.466 44.466 44.657
5 United States 6.291 50.757 50.757 71.563
6 Netherlands 4.501 55.258 55.258 55.048
7 France 4.436 59.693 59.693 55.044
8 China 3.903 63.596   0.004
9 Italy 3.756 67.352 63.449 57.087
10 Finland 3.402 70.754 66.852 34.807
11 Japan 3.377 74.132 70.229 22.155
12 Belgium 2.276 76.407 72.505 44.587
13 Russia 2.236 78.643   0
14 Canada 2.191 80.835 74.696 75.767
15 Spain 1.612 82.447 76.308 54.864
16 Ireland 1.453 83.900 77.761 16.159
17 Poland 1.217 85.117 78.978 2.900
18 Switzerland 1.216 86.333 80.194 44.957
19 Taiwan 0.942 87.275   0.177
20 Austria 0.909 88.184 81.103 60.830
21 Brazil 0.794 88.979   0
22 Korea 0.710 89.689 81.814 0
23 Czech Republic 0.568 90.257 82.381 0.981
24 Portugal 0.563 90.819 82.944 27.537
25 Singapore 0.546 91.365   50.736
26 Turkey 0.511 91.876 83.454 0
27 Hong Kong 0.435 92.311   12.339
28 Malaysia 0.405 92.716   0.502
29 Hungary 0.404 93.120 83.859 0
30 Suriname 0.402 93.523   0
31 Botswana 0.402 93.925   0
32 Estonia 0.377 94.301   7.536
33 Thailand 0.369 94.670   1.696
34 India 0.337 95.007   0.164
35 Jamaica 0.325 95.332   0
(To be continued)
38Table A.1 (Continued)
Rank Countries Import Accumulated share PCI
share All countries OECD
36 Lithuania 0.306 95.638   4.610
37 Iceland 0.242 95.880 84.101 1.664
38 Romania 0.240 96.119   0
39 Indonesia 0.236 96.356   0
40 Australia 0.216 96.572 84.317 8.211
41 Latvia 0.215 96.787   4.160
42 South Africa 0.206 96.993   1.539
43 Israel 0.171 97.164   0
44 Peru 0.161 97.325   0
45 Vietnam 0.152 97.477   0
46 Chile 0.149 97.626   0
47 Mexico 0.128 97.753 84.444 0
48 Greece 0.126 97.880 84.571 36.310
49 Colombia 0.124 98.004   0
50 Slovak Republic 0.115 98.119 84.686 0
51 Pakistan 0.114 98.233   0.424
52 Argentina 0.114 98.347   0
53 Ukraine 0.107 98.454   0
54 Slovenia 0.105 98.559   0.001
55 Bangladesh 0.100 98.659   0
56 Tajikistan 0.100 98.759   0
57 Morocco 0.094 98.853   0
58 Costa Rica 0.077 98.929   0
59 Luxembourg 0.074 99.003   35.913
60 Philippines 0.074 99.078   0
61 Venezuela 0.059 99.137   0
62 Uruguay 0.059 99.195   0
63 Saudi Arabia 0.043 99.238   0
64 New Zealand 0.042 99.280 84.728 7.461
Notes: The rst column with gures denotes Norway's (average) share in imports from the respective
partner country. The second column presents the accumulated import share, whereas the third column
gives the accumulated import share for OECD countries only (which are indicated by asterisks). PCI refers
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